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I.    Introduction 
  The adoption of stabilization programs is usually a painful process, both 
politically and economically.  History is replete with instances where, even at the light of 
obvious and flagrant macroeconomics disequilibria, the implementation of stabilization 
programs is significantly delayed.  Why do policymakers and/or politicians prefer to live 
with growing inflationary pressures and implement price and other forms of highly 
inefficient controls, instead of tackling the roots of macroeconomic imbalances?  Is the 
prolongation of inflation the consequence of mistaken views on the mechanics of fiscal 
deficits and money creation, or is it the unavoidable result of the political game?  Why 
after months of apparent political stalemate, all of a sudden stabilization programs that 
closely resemble others proposed earlier are adopted?  These questions are at the heart of 
the political economy of stabilization and inflationary finance.1  In recent years the 
analysis of these issues has attained new interest, as a number of authors have applied the 
tools of game theory to the study of macroeconomic policymaking.  Although important 
theoretical progress has been achieved in the explanation of some of these phenomena, 
the amount of empirical and historical work on the subject is still rather limited.2    
  The purpose of this paper is to investigate an important historical stabilization 
episode in Chile, one of the countries with the longest history of chronic inflation in the 
world.  Starting in the late 19th century, Chile suffered recurrent and increasingly 
frequent inflationary outbursts.  Of the many stabilization programs adopted to tackle this 
problem, the 1955-58 package implemented with the advice of the U.S. consulting firm 
of Klein-Saks, is, undoubtedly, one of the most fascinating ones.3  Its interest is based on 
a number of factors:  first, at the time the program was put in place inflation had reached 
the extremely high annual level (for that time) of 85% (see Table 1).  Second, the policies 
adopted contradicted the newly dominant orthodoxy in Latin America that associated 
                                                            
1Latin American debates on inflation and stabilization have traditionally emphasized political economy 
angles.  It is only recently, however, that these issues have begun to be tackled using a formal economics 
framework. 
2 For a masterful presentation of recent advances on the political economy of macroeconomics policy 
making see Drazen (2000). 
3It is certainly a stabilization attempt that has attracted considerable attention from academic economists.  
See, for example, Hirshman (1963), Felix (1960), Edwards (1986).   2 
inflation to structural problems.4  Third, the Klein-Saks program took place in a period of 
acute political confrontation.  Fourth, the episode is interesting because after what was 
considered to be an initial success -- inflation declined to 38% in 1956, and was further 
reduced to 17% in 1957 -- the program failed to achieve durable price stability (see 
Figure 1).  Finally, what makes this episode particularly noteworthy is that the program 
proposed by the Klein-Saks mission was very similar to anti-inflationary plans that had 
been previously elaborated by several government agencies, including the Ministry of 
Finance and the Central Bank, in the period 1954-55.  However, while these earlier 
stabilization efforts were rejected by Congress, most (but not all) of the Mission’s 
program was approved by Congress.  This characteristic of the episodes raises the issue 
of the role of foreign advisors in the design (and implementation) of economic policy.   
In this paper I argue that the foreign advisors of the Klein-Saks Mission gave 
initial credibility to the stabilization program launched in 1955.  These foreign advisors 
played the role of independent, non-partisan, technocratic arbiters.  It was precisely 
because they were foreigners that they could raise above the political fray, and suggest a 
specific program, whose main components were rapidly approved by a highly divided 
Congress.  The fact that the program was very similar to one proposed earlier by the 
government – and that was rejected by Congress -- underscores the view that, while 
locals are suspect of being excessively partisan, foreigners are often (but not always) seen 
as independent policy brokers.  But providing initial credibility was not enough to ensure 
success. In spite of supporting trade reform, foreign exchange rate reform, and the de-
indexation of wages, Congress failed to act decisively on the fiscal front.  Consequently 
the fiscal imbalances that had plagued Chile for a long time were reduced, but not 
eliminated.  In 1957 a sharp drop in the international price of copper – the country’s main 
export – resulted in a major decline in fiscal revenue and in an increase in the fiscal 
deficit.  The Mission recommended a series of belt-tightening measures, but politicians 
had had enough of orthodoxy.  No adjustment was made, and inflationary expectations 
once again shifted for the worse.  By October of 1958 the Mission had left the country, 
and an opportunity for achieving stability had been lost.   
                                                            
4On the structuralist view of inflation see, for example, Sunkel (1958).   3 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  In Section II I provide a broad 
historical background on the Ibañez del Campo presidency in Chile during 1952-1958.  In 
Section III I present the analytical framework for interpreting the Klein-Saks episode.  
This framework is based on the modern theory of credibility, and makes use of concepts 
such as war of attrition and external enforcers.  Section IV focuses on Chile’s inflationary 
experience.  Here I discuss in great detail economic conditions in the early 1950’s and I 
focus on the mechanisms behind the country’s increasing rate of inflation.  I discuss 
President Ibañez del Campo original populist program, and I deal with two failed 
stabilization programs implemented during the early 1950s.  In Section V I discuss in 
detail the program proposed by the Klein-Saks Mission, focusing on two of its main 
components:  wage de-indexation and the reform of the exchange rate system.  In Section 
VI I focus on the role played by the Klein-Saks Mission in the stabilization effort 
launched in late 1955.  In this part of the paper I concentrate on three inter-related issues:  
First, I analyze whether the diagnosis of inflation causes differed significantly from 
previous analyses.  That is, I investigate whether from a purely technical perspective the 
Mission provided new approaches and insights.  Second, I explore the extent to which the 
Mission' s program was credible; more specifically, I investigate the presence of the 
external advisors provided a pre-commitment technology.  And third, I use congressional 
records and correspondence files to analyze the political process -- including the 
formation of alliances and coalitions -- that led in early 1956 to the adoption of the so-
called “stabilization package”.   In Section VII I use time series econometric techniques 
to analyze whether the work Mission’s Stabilization Program was credible to the public.  
Finally, in Section VIII I present some concluding remarks.  
 
II.   Historical Background 
In 1952 former army general Carlos Ibañez del Campo was elected president of 
Chile by a significant margin.5  His campaign had been carried out on the basis of a “new 
beginning” -- he was called by his supporters “the General of Hope” (El General de la 
Esperanza) -- and as a reaction against the political establishment.  He was supported by 
                                                            
5Ibañez del Campo obtained 47% of the votes.  The right-wing candidate Arturo Matte got 28%, while the 
radical Pedro Enrique Alfonso obtained 20%.  The socialist candidate, and future president, Salvador 
Allende obtained less than 6%.   4 
a loosely knit coalition of populists, nationalists and socialists.  The general himself, 
however, was not a member of any political party, and from the very beginning of his 
campaign stated his intentions of being highly independent from the parties.  His 
program’s rhetoric was decisively populist and had an anti-establishment content.  The 
presence of socialists in the coalition was not window dressing; they participated in the 
first Ibañez del Campo cabinet with three ministers, including finance.6  As time 
progressed however, it became apparent that Ibañez del Campo personalistic approach to 
government was increasingly incompatible with the socialist program.  In October of 
1953, less than a year after Ibañez del Campo had taken office, the socialist party 
abandoned the governing coalition.7 
Carlos Ibañez del Campo inherited a country with serious macroeconomic 
disequilibria, stemming mostly from significant fiscal imbalances financed by the Central 
Bank.  During the first two years of the Ibañez del Campo presidency no serious attempt 
at fighting inflation was made.  Quite the contrary, influenced by a combination of 
populist views and an approach to monetary policy based on the “real bills doctrine,” 
monetary policy became increasingly lax, generating a rapid acceleration of inflation.  
The propagation of price increases was greatly helped by the existence of a broad-based 
wage indexation system that mandated wage adjustments by the amount of accumulated 
past inflation.8 
After a failed stabilization attempt, in 1955 inflation surged towards the 100% 
level.  Politically, Ibañez del Campo became increasingly isolated as both the right 
(conservative and liberal), the centrist Radical Party and the left stepped up their 
opposition tactics.  Labor unrest was mounting and a generalized political dissatisfaction 
was apparent.  It was at this juncture of Chile’s political and economic history that the 
men of the Klein-Saks mission arrived in Chile.9  Their task was to tame inflation, attain 
stability, and help set the stage for a recovery program.   
                                                            
6 In Chile the socialist party had strong Marxist inclinations.  It was not a social democratic party. 
7See, for example, Ampuero (1969) and Jobet (1971). 
8This process of backward looking indexation was informally initiated in the late 1950s and legalized 
through Law 10,343 in mid-1952. 
9The Mission was hired in July 1955; the five-man team arrived in Santiago in September.  Their first 
memorandum was delivered to the president in November.  The mission was led by Mr. Preston Carter, a   5 
The emphasis in this paper is not on the actual policies and results of the Klein-
Saks mission, but rather on the political economy process that led to the hiring of these 
consultants and to the (at least partial) adoption of their policies.  That is, I am interested 
in understanding what was the role of the external advisors, and, in particular, whether 
their advice helped the Ibañez del Campo administration solve its credibility and 
commitment problem.  I also investigate whether the fact that the Mission was hired 
affected how different players perceived the costs of delaying the resolution of the 
inflationary pressures. 
 
III.  The Basic Analytics of the Political Economy of Inflation and Stabilization 
Since the early 1990s there has been renewed interest in analyzing the political 
economy dimensions of macroeconomics policymaking.  Many of these theoretical 
developments have formally used game theory to describe the way in which different 
actors interplay in the policymaking process.  The purpose of this section is to provide an 
analytical framework for the historical analysis that follows.  I briefly review some of the 
most important features of the theoretical literature on inflation, placing particular 
emphasis on stabilization programs.   
Generally speaking, political economy models of macroeconomic policymaking 
stress the distributional impact of both inflation and stabilization.  The existence of 
distributional and political conflict fuels the inflationary process.  There are many 
possible channels through which political conflict may result in higher inflation.  
Cuikerman, Edwards and Tabellini (1991), for instance, have suggested a model where 
politicians have different preferences and act strategically.  This strategic interaction 
results in an inefficient tax system, and in the inflationary finance of the fiscal deficit.  In 
this type of models, a higher degree of political instability will result in higher seignorage 
and higher inflation; a greater degree of political polarization – measured as the 
difference in political parties’ preferences --, will also result in higher inflation.   
Interestingly, this approach not only explains the origin of inflation, but it also 
provides insights about the timing of the stabilization.  In this framework, stabilizing the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
man with ample practical experience both in the private and government sector.  His colorful Spanish and 
straightforward manners rapidly established him as a trusted advisor.  See Correa Prieto (1962).   6 
price level means changing the political status-quo.  This, in turn, may generate new 
disputes among political groups about the share of the burden of the fiscal adjustment.  
These political disputes are likely to take the form of a “war of attrition,” during which 
all the conflicting groups wait for one of them to finally give up.  The group that “blinks 
first” is forced to bear a disproportionate burden of the adjustment.10  This “war of 
attrition” results in a delay of the stabilization.  A particularly interesting feature of these 
models is that this delay takes place even in situations where there is general agreement 
among conflicting groups about the overall form of the adjustment policies needed to 
stop inflationary pressures.  Of course, postponing stabilization will usually increase the 
size of the adjustment effort needed, and thus exacerbates the political conflict.11  
Existing theoretical models based on the war of attrition concept have been quite 
general, and have not always specified the precise mechanism (or mechanisms) through 
which the conflict finally is resolved.  What makes one of the players retreat?  Why at 
some point the perceived cost of waiting exceeds the benefit?  What is the role of 
political negotiations?  Can a third party, or mediator, help bring the conflict to a faster 
end?  Addressing these issues at a theoretical level is well beyond the scope of this paper.  
However, in discussing and interpreting the Klein-Saks episode I consider some 
(possible) complications of the straightforward war of attrition model.   
A somewhat different, although not contradictory, approach to inflation and 
stabilization is based on the role of institutions and credibility.  After the rational 
expectations revolution, many authors emphasized the importance of expectations during 
stabilization episodes.  A number of them, and most notably Sargent, concluded that in 
order to put an end to any inflationary process, a “credible” change of the monetary and 
fiscal regimes was needed.12  To the extent that stabilization is not credible -- that is, the 
stabilization program is not expected to achieve the intended results -- the costs of 
adjustment escalate and the probability of a successful stabilization becomes smaller.13   
This view led naturally to look for ways of modifying and influencing expectations 
                                                            
10For more details on this outcome, see Alesina and Drazen (1989), and Drazen (2000).  
11For an early study on the effects of a postponed adjustment, see, Edwards and Montiel (1990).  See also 
Drazen (2000). 
12This was the message of Sargent (1983,1986). 
13Along similar lines see Dornbusch (1991).   7 
during a stabilization program.  The role of “policy announcements” has been analyzed as 
possible means of affecting inflationary expectations.  In this connection, however, it has 
been stressed that in order for these announcements to be “credible” -- and thus to 
actually affect expectations -- it is necessary for the government to be able to precommit 
itself to a given course of action.  This, of course, turns out to be difficult to do, since 
societies many times lack the institutional setup required for government to credibly 
precommit itself.   
Credibility-based models have also emphasized the role of reputation as a 
substitute for precommitment.  According to this approach the desire of governments to 
preserve their reputation -- or even, possibly, to improve it -- provides them with a 
constrained set of policy options.14  Some authors have suggested that expectations can 
be coordinated and that credibility can be established if it is supported by an external 
institution, such as the League of Nations in the 1920s and the International Monetary 
Fund after 1950.15  The reason is that by granting its “seal of approval” to a stabilization 
plan, an external institution enhances the confidence in the program.  In principle, this 
“seal of approval” is independent of the financing that the external institution can 
provide.16  In fact, the presence of external involvement can endow the stabilizing 
government with a  “commitment technology” that gives an assurance that the announced 
program will indeed be fully carried out. 
 
IV.  Inflation in the Early 1950s in Chile 
In this section I provide some background information on the Chilean inflationary 
process before the arrival of the Klein-Saks Mission.  I concentrate on the path leading to 
very rapid inflation in 1954-55 and I discuss the characteristics of the most important 
stabilization attempts undertaken during the years prior to the arrival of the Mission. 
 
 
                                                            
14See Persson and Tabellini (1990, 2000). 
15See Sachs (1989), Edwards (1989) and Santaella (1993). 
16Accounts of the support given by external credits and loans to stabilizing countries are in the League of 
Nations (1946), Dornbusch and Fischer (1986) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).  On the IMF as a provider 
of a “seal of approval” see Boughton (2002, 2003) and Vreeland (2003).   8 
IV.1  The End of the “Radical” Presidencies 
During the years 1938 to 1952 the centrist Radical Party was the dominant 
political force in Chile.  Throughout this period the country underwent a rapid 
industrialization process based on import substitution policies, and experienced a fairly 
rapid rate of growth.17  Gabriel Gonzalez-Videla, the third Radical President, came into 
power in 1946 supported by a coalition of Radicals, Socialists, and Communists.  The 
Communist Party, however, had a short stay in office: in 1948 the so-called “Law of 
Defense of Democracy,” which outlawed the Communist Party was enacted.  For the rest 
of its period, Gonzalez-Videla governed with the support of the rightist liberal and 
conservative parties. 
During the Gonzalez-Videla presidency, Chile experienced increasingly large 
macroeconomic imbalances that led to rapid inflation, low savings and investment and 
recurrent external sector difficulties.  Wages were under continuous pressure, monetary 
policy was dominated by supporters of the “real bills doctrine” that believed that money 
creation channeled towards industry was not inflationary, and public finances became 
extremely fragile.  In spite of the fact that after the expulsion of the communists, the 
Ministry of Finance was controlled by austere conservative politicians, the rate of money 
creation was extremely high.  For instance, between 1945 and 1951 the stock of high-
powered money increased at a rate that exceeded 30% per year.18   
These inflationary pressures resulted in two important macroeconomic 
developments that shaped many of the policies that were to be taken in the next ten years:  
first, in order to deal with external sector imbalances and to fight tendencies towards real 
exchange rate overvaluation, a system of multiple nominal exchange rates was 
developed.  While during the first year of the Gabriel Gonzalez-Videla there were three 
official exchange rates ranging from 37 to 31 pesos per U.S. dollar, by 1952 the number 
of official rates had increased to five with their range going from 19.37 to 60 pesos per 
                                                            
17See, for instance, Mamalakis (1976). 
18  The two most important Finance Ministers were Jorge Alessandri (who in 1958 became President of the 
Republic) and Carlos Vial.  As Felix (1960), they did not always agree on the causes behind the country’s 
rapidly increasing rate of inflation.   9 
U.S. dollar (see Table 2).19  However, in spite of the adoption of this discriminatory 
exchange rate system and of the imposition of generalized controls and trade restrictions, 
the external sector was under continuous pressure during this period.  Not surprisingly, 
the foreign exchange parallel (or black) market premium increased from a level of around 
30% in 1946 to almost 400% towards the end of the Gonzalez-Videla administration (see 
Figure 2).  As a result of this situation, increasing amounts of resources left the country in 
the form of capital flight.20   
The second important macroeconomic development of this period was the 
institutionalization of a wage rate indexation mechanism.  As inflation increased, a 1941 
law mandating the yearly adjustment of minimum wages for white collar workers became 
a more and more important piece of the existing economic legislation.  Although this law 
did not specify all the details of this adjustment process -- it did not say, for example, in 
what percentage wages should be adjusted relative to past inflation --, actual mandated 
wage increases became de facto fully linked to past inflation.  Moreover, in some years 
(1949-50, for instance) the wage adjustment decreed by the government greatly exceeded 
accumulated inflation during the preceding year.21  These automatic wage adjustments 
fed back into prices, generating a high self-feeding process that was constantly validated 
by the Central Bank.  The process became more entrenched in late 1952, when a law 
mandating an automatic backward-looking wage adjustment for public sector wages of 
90% of past inflation was enacted.  Initially this legislation applied only to public 
servants.  By 1954, however, its reach had increased greatly; approximately half a million 
public and private sector workers’ salaries were adjusted according to the mechanism 
determined by this law.   
The combination of this indexation mechanism with the increasing importance of 
the parallel market for foreign exchange resulted in a highly inertial inflationary process, 
as well as important distortions in the external sector.  The contribution of the indexation 
                                                            
19These rates were “official” in the sense of being sanctioned by the authorities.  However, one of them 
only received the technical name of “official exchange rate.”  What made things more complicated was that 
there were also a number of "mixed" rates, corresponding to weighted averages of the six “official” rates. 
20See, for example, the United Nation' s 1951 Technical Assistance report on Chile' s inflation (p. 3).  This 
report was written by a team of foreign experts led by Erik Lindahl from the University of Upsala. 
21See Hirshman (1963).  The Chilean indexation scheme of this period is described, in a comparative 
setting, in Sen Gupta (1958).   10 
mechanism to inflation was understood early on by many (but not all) Chilean 
economists.  In fact, in the period 1949-55 the elimination, or at least partial control, of 
this indexation procedure was at the center of policy discussion and was considered an 
essential component of most stabilization attempts.  In 1949 the government requested 
two foreign advisory reports on the causes of inflation and on possible ways to stop it.  
Although these two reports -- by a United Nations team and by the staff of the 
International Monetary Fund -- differed in many respects, they agreed that an elimination 
of the inflationary pressure would require dealing with wage adjustments.22 
IV.2  Ibañez del Campo’s Populist Program 
In 1952 Carlos Ibañez del Campo became the candidate of the disillusioned.  The 
72 year old retired army general captured voters’ frustration and disappointment with the 
traditional political parties.  Not being himself a member of a political party, he was 
supported by a loose coalition of personal followers (Ibañistas), nationalists (Partido 
Agrario Laboristas, (PAL) and Socialists.  From early on the Agrario Laboristas became 
the backbone of the coalition, helping determine the main social, foreign and economic 
policies.23   
Although during the presidential campaign Ibañez del Campo was (deliberately) 
vague regarding the details of his economic program, his discourse had a clear populist 
tone.24  He promised to eliminate inflation, to increase the standard of living, to create a 
strong government-owned bank, and to put an end to corruption.  The Partido Agrario 
Laborista (PAL), however, had a more clearly defined economic program that explicitly 
called for increased subsidized credit for productive purposes; higher public investment 
in transportation and other forms of infrastructure, modernization of agriculture, the 
encouragement of exports, and the creation of a heavy industry.25 
After taking power on November, 1952, Ibañez del Campo named Juan B. 
Rosetti, a socialist, to the Ministry of Finance.  In spite of the government' s statements 
                                                            
22These two reports differed, however, in their emphasis.  While the Fund considered the elimination of 
indexation as the center of a stabilization program, the U.N. proposal revolved around a price freeze and an 
obligatory savings scheme. 
23  On the PAL, see Garay Vera (1990). 
24  Interestingly enough, and contrary to other populist experiences in Latin America, in addition to 
courting the urban masses, Ibañez del Campo sought (and obtained) support among the rural voters. 
25  On the PAL economic program see Garay Vera (1990).   11 
that defeating inflation was a high priority, during the period 1952-55 the fiscal deficit 
and money creation reached record proportions.26  Wage increases, higher transfers, and 
growing bank credit were rapidly feeding higher price increases.  Between December of 
1951 and December of 1954 the Central Bank credit to the government increased by 
430% (see Figure 3 on monetary growth).   
In 1953, Minister of Finance Felipe Herrera, a socialist who later became the 
president of the Interamerican Development Bank, put together a stabilization program 
based on a devaluation of the peso, credit controls, and higher income taxes.  No effort 
however was made to put an end to the wage indexation scheme.  Quite on the contrary, 
the devaluation -- most commercial transactions became subject to a 110 pesos per dollar 
rate -- was accompanied by a 15% increase in the so-called Family-Allowance, a per head 
bonus paid to each worker.  Moreover, the program was not fully implemented; after an 
intense debate, Congress refused to increase taxes, with inflation continuing its rapid 
acceleration. 
Instead of following up on the Herrera program and trying to work out a political 
solution to the impasse, President Ibañez del Campo decided to alter the course of 
economic policy.  Herrera was replaced by an Ibañez del Campo supporter of clear 
populist inclinations, who immediately eliminated credit controls, increased government 
expenditures and wage adjustments.27  Undoubtedly Ibañez del Campo' s own personality 
affected the nature of the inflationary process.  His sudden changes of heart, his political 
gyrations and his stubborn independence from political and economic advisors, more 
often than not added fuel to inflation. 
A second stabilization attempt took place in mid-1954 under the leadership of 
Jorge Prat, a nationalist politician that had been a member of the conservative party until 
1947.  This program was even broader and more ambitious than that proposed by Felipe 
Herrera.  Its main components included:  
·  government austerity through lower expenditures;  
·  a new devaluation;  
                                                            
26  Ffrench-Davis (1973) points out that the rate of money expansion during this period had only been 
exceeded during the Socialist Republic of 1932. 
27See Hirshman (1963) and Ffrench-Davis (1973) on this episode.   12 
·  higher taxes;  
·  the reestablishment of credit controls;  
·  reforming the system of wage indexation by reducing the extent of the 
adjustment to 60% of accumulated past inflation;  
·  increasing the coverage of the minimum wage;  
·  imposing a forced profits reinvestment policy on corporations.   
 
This program -- which was known as the “Program of Economic Rectification” 
(Programa de Rectficación Económica) -- received some initial political support by 
Congress, and some of its components including the devaluation and a partial adjustment 
of taxes were undertaken.  Once again, however, the complete program was not approved 
by Congress, and once again taxes and wages were at the heart of the political impasse: 
the right, the radicals and the left voted against tax increases, and the wage de-indexation 
rules.  At that point, political bickering increased significantly, with the opposition parties 
stepping up their anti-government campaign.  In December, Congress stripped the 
government of executive privileges and put an end to a state of emergency imposed 
earlier that year.  A succession of Finance Ministers went in and out of office in rapid 
succession.28  The leftist opposition rapidly began to gather momentum, and major labor 
conflicts ensued.  A number of major strikes took place, with political dissatisfaction 
becoming ever more apparent.  The government was clearly on the defensive.   
In January 1955, under the fifth Minister of Finance of the Ibañez del Campo 
administration, a 60% generalized wage adjustment was granted.  In that month inflation 
reached an annual rate of almost 57% and the premium in the parallel market for foreign 
exchange surpassed the 70% mark, almost doubling from its level in November of 1954 
when the Prat devaluation was engineered. 
As the year 1955 began, the political situation became increasingly fragile, with a 
group of Ibañez del Campo supporters -- including the so-called “grey wolves” (lobos 
grises) -- discussing with some high military officers -- the “Straight Line” (Linea Recta) 
group -- the possibility of staging a coup that would have dissolved Congress, while 
                                                            
28  A drastic decline in the price of copper, made things more complicated, Zahler (1978).  See Ffrench-
Davis (1973).   13 
retaining Ibañez del Campo as the head of state.  The extent of the plot, and the 
vulnerability of the democratic system, became starkly clear when Senator Guillermo 
Izquierdo, the Chairman of the Partido Agrario Laborista, recognized that he himself had 
been involved in discussions with the military from “Straight Line” group.29 
 
V.  The Klein-Saks Mission:  Diagnosis and Policy Recommendations 
On July of 1955 the government of Chile hired the Klein-Saks consulting firm to 
evaluate the economic conditions of the country and to provide a set of recommendations 
regarding anti-inflationary policy.30  Two months later the five men mission arrived in 
Santiago for what was originally supposed to be a six-month visit.  Things, however, 
were not so simple; the Mission worked continuously in Chile until September of 1958.  
By then, however, inflation had not been tamed.  In October of 1958 the 12 months rate 
of inflation was 16%, significantly higher than what the Mission had expected when it 
had arrived in Chile three years earlier. 31  But the worst was yet to come.  By December 
1958 inflation had climbed to 33%, and by mid-1959 it was almost 45%.  By then the 
Klein-Saks Mission had been added to a long list of Chile’s failed stabilization programs. 
In this section I discuss the diagnosis made by the Mission, as well as its original 
policy recommendations.  I also analyze the political discussion that surrounded the first 
year of the Mission’s work.  Although the main interest of this paper is on the adoption 
and implementation of the Mission’s program, in subsection V.2 I briefly deal with the 
final phases of the program, and I discuss the reasons behind its eventual failure. 
V.1  Diagnosis 
Approximately 45 days after its arrival, on November 19, 1955 the Mission 
delivered its first policy memorandum to President Ibañez del Campo, stating its overall 
view on the economic conditions, and sketching some of its most important policy 
recommendations.  The Mission' s diagnosis of Chile’s inflationary pressures revolved 
                                                            
29See Garay Vera (1990, p. 178). 
30  Government leaders debated intensively on who could provide the best advice.  The candidates included 
Dr. Dagmar Schacht, of Nazi fame, and the French economist Pierre Mendes-France.  A number of 
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around four basic areas:  (1) fiscal deficit, (2) monetary expansion, (3) exchange rate 
policy, and (4) wage rate policy. 
The Mission forcefully argued that the state of government finances and, in 
particular, the extremely high fiscal deficit was at the heart of the inflationary process.  It 
was suggested that this problem was to be tackled by a combination of higher revenues, 
to be obtained via the combination of a tax reform that would include stiff penalties for 
tax evasion and payment delays, and reduced expenditures.  Among the specific measures 
recommended to cut down public expenditures the Mission included the “suppression of 
foreign travel by public functionaries,” the “elimination, if possible, of subsidies to public 
railways, maritime freight, airlines, buses, and electricity”, and the reduction (again if 
possible) “of the acquisition of arms and weapons.”32   
The Mission also pointed out that while fiscal laxity was the main cause of 
inflation, price increases themselves had helped to further weaken the efficiency of the 
tax system:33 
 
“The entire tax system had become distorted, with the incidence of taxes 
being far different from the intentions of the legislators.  All taxes fixed in 
numbers of peso and all taxes paid with a time lag had a lesser incidence 
than had been intended ... As a consequence tax revenue had become 
insufficient to finance even a constant level of real expenditures...”  (Klein & 
Saks, 1958, p. 3)  [Emphasis added]. 
    
   Of course, the statement in italics means that the Mission recognized what in time 
has come to be known as the Olivera-Tanzi effect:  lagged tax collection in an 
inflationary environment can greatly erode tax revenues.  Consequently, an important 
recommendation of the Mission was to replace specific taxes for ad-valorem ones and to 
reduce the tax collection lag.   
   With respect to credit policy, the Mission argued that excessive money creation, 
mostly (but not exclusively) devoted to finance government expenditures constituted an 
important element fueling inflation.  Their monetary analysis was traditional and strictly 
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based on the quantity theory of money.  For instance, in evaluating Chile' s capacity to 
conduct noninflationary monetary creation a Mission report stated:34 
 
“Considering that the Chilean economy is fully employed, that population 
grows at a 1.6% annual rate and that national income has rarely exceeded 
3.5%, it is not justifiable to expend liquidity at a rate exceeding 5 to 6% per 
annum.” 
 
And the letter went on to say:   
 
“It is, thus, not surprising that with an increase in monetary means of almost 70% 
in 1955, price increases had reached almost 80%.” 
 
   In terms of policy, the Mission suggested imposing quantitative credit limits to the 
banking system, and urged the Central Bank to make use of the control attributions that a 
new charter had provided in 1953.  Additionally, it recommended that the Central Bank 
charged an interest rate close to the market rate for its own loans and other operations.  
Much of the Mission’s early work on monetary policy consisted of persuading the public, 
and especially some prominent group of industrialists, that money creation devoted to 
increasing credit to industry was still inflationary.  In fact, as was suggested earlier, at the 
time Chilean entrepreneurs were highly influenced by the real bills doctrine and argued 
that it was crucial to distinguish between “speculative” and “productive” credit.   
   With respect to exchange policy, the Mission argued that under a situation of 
multiple exchange rates and severe overvaluation, as the one prevailing in Chile in late 
1955, the rest of the anti-inflationary measures would be self-defeating.  Without 
introducing rapid and substantial corrective measures in the foreign sector it was clear 
that the public would continue to speculate against the peso, introducing a dangerous 
instability into the financial and banking sectors.   
   In a letter to the Minister of Finance dated January 16, 1956, the Mission argued 
that it was urgent to implement in the very short run a reform of the exchange rate 
system: 
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“An anti-inflationary program that excludes a reform of the exchange rate 
system will, at best, generate a temporary and short run reduction of 
inflation.  It would fail, however, to provide the country with a solid base for 
future economic growth and development...” 
 
   In April of 1956, and after the IMF had granted its approval, a new exchange rate 
system consisting of a single fluctuating exchange rate for commercial transactions and a 
freely floating rate for capital movements was adopted.  In fact, this dual floating 
exchange rate system was vintage Klein.  In 1949, Julius Klein, one of the principal 
partners of the consulting firm had advised the government of Peru recommending, 
among other things, the adoption of a dual rate fluctuating system.  This regime lasted in 
Peru from November 1949 to December 1954.35   
   Initially it was thought that the Central Bank would occasionally intervene in the 
foreign exchange market in order to smooth excessive fluctuations.  In fact, with the aid 
of the IMF the government created a U.S. $70 million stabilization fund for this purpose.  
Rather quickly, however, the government began to intervene in the market a direct way, 
by de facto pegging the commercial rate.  By 1957 the exchange rate became a serious 
area of disagreement between the government and the Mission.  While the latter argued 
that new world and national conditions required a substantial depreciation of the peso, the 
government refused to do it on the grounds that it would increase inflation.   
   The exchange system reform of 1956 was accompanied by a series of measures 
geared at organizing the control of international trade systems.  The most important 
elements of the new foreign trade regime were the existence of a list of forbidden 
commodities which could not be imported into the country and the implementation of a 
system of previous import deposits whereby, at the time of requiring an import license, 
importers had to make a deposit (in the Central Bank) equivalent to a percentage of the 
merchandise to be imported.   
   Although the Mission’s reports recognized from the beginning that the anti-
inflationary policy should be seen as a package with multiple interrelated components, 
they also stressed that limiting the extent of wage indexation was the most important 
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short run measure.  This position was based on both economic and strategic 
considerations.  First, the Mission recognized that the automatic wage adjustment 
mechanism introduced inertia into the system through both cost pushes and higher 
inflationary expectations.  Thus, eliminating (or even limiting) indexation would provide 
an important blow to inflationary psychology and to cost increases.  Second, according to 
the existing legislation the annual wage adjustment was due at the end of January of 
1956.  When the Mission issued its first report in mid-November 1955, Congress was 
already devoted to the discussion of the nature of the upcoming wage bill.  It was, thus, 
fundamentally important to handle this situation head on, without much delay.  It was 
considered that tackling the wage adjustment issue could not wait until a consistent and 
comprehensive package was fully available.   
   The central role given by the Mission to limiting the extent of indexation is 
apparent in the following quote from a letter to the Minister of Finance dated December 
17, 1955: 
 
“[I]t is clear that unless the current system of automatic wage readjustments 
is eliminated (or at least modified), it will be impossible to have a successful 
implementation of the restrictive credit and budget policies...” 
 
In a grave and fateful mood the letter stated that: 
 
“[t]he country is now a prisoner of a past that invented the current automatic 
[wage] adjustment system.” 
 
   A large fraction of the Mission' s efforts during the first few months in Santiago 
were devoted to convincing government officials, politicians and civic leaders of the 
necessity of limiting wage adjustment for 1956 to no more than 50% of accumulated past 
inflation.36  The specific proposal (Law 12,006) was presented to Congress in November 
of 1955 and was approved by the Lower House (the Cámara de Diputados) on December 
22 by a comfortable margin.37  The PAL, other Ibañista groups and the right wing parties 
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(conservatives and liberals) voted for its approval, with the left and the radicals opposing 
it.   
   The Senate, however, was a different story; the government and its new allies did 
not have a clear majority in the higher chamber of congress.  The 3rd of January of 1956 
was probably one of the most memorable days in Senate history.  The debate was long 
and intense and after two votes a nineteen-nineteen draw persisted.  It was only on the 6th 
of January that this piece of legislation, known as the “Stabilization Program” (Programa 
de Estabilización), was approved when ailing Senator and former Presidential candidate, 
Cruz-Coke was brought to the Senate floor to participate in the third vote. 
   From a political economy perspective, perhaps the most important aspect of this 
episode is that Law 12,006 and, more generally, the Klein-Saks stabilization package as a 
whole was supported by the conservative and liberal parties.  These were the same parties 
that had so vehemently opposed Ibañez del Campo in the past.  Not only that, but these 
were the same politicians that in November of 1954 -- during the Prat stabilization 
attempt -- had refused to support legislation that would put an end to indexation.  Why 
did they support this legislation in early 1956, and not in 1954?  Was it only because 
inflation has crossed some threshold number that made it so costly as to make some 
political parties change their position?38  Did the presence of the Klein-Saks Mission 
have anything to do with this change in the right' s position?  Some of these issues are 
addressed in Sections VI and VII of this paper. 
V.2  The End of the Affair:  Unraveling and Departure  
   As soon as Law 12,006, that restricted wage indexation, was approved, the Mission 
turned its efforts to the fiscal deficit.  In a letter addressed to the Minister of Finance 
dated January 16, 1956 the Mission said: 
 
“We need to note that…the limits on wage indexation and the control of credit 
would loose their effectiveness unless they are immediately followed by…[the] 
control of fiscal expenditure…[and]…tax measures…” [Emphasis in the original] 
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   Among the expenditure-related measures the Mission recommended putting an end 
to low income housing subsidies, canceling public construction projects, reducing the 
personnel in diplomatic missions, increasing the price of postage, and suspending 
military purchases.  In terms of tax measures the Mission suggested to levy taxes on the 
bases of current (as opposed to last year’s) income, raise fuel taxes, enforcing the tax 
code, and sending tax evaders to prison.39   
   The fiscal accounts, however, did not evolve in the way the Mission had envisaged 
them.  On the one hand, Congress was reluctant to enact a major tax reform; on the other, 
the Ibañez del Campo administration was unwilling to reduce expenditures in a 
significant way.  Paradoxically, the IMF program of 1956 – under which the country 
borrowed US$ 81.3 million – had a negative effect on fiscal austerity.  The reasons for 
this were simple: at that time the IMF had yet developed the concept of conditionality 
and, thus, there were no formal (and legal) austerity conditions attached to the program.  
Once the IMF funds became available, the administration felt that a serious financial 
constraint had been lifted, and considered that there was no need to reduce expenditures 
drastically.40  After declining in 1956, the fiscal deficit again increased in 1957; in 1958 it 
experienced a slight decline, but is was still being financed mostly by money creation 
(See Table 3).  
     A drastic drop in the price of copper in late 1956 and 1957 greatly affected fiscal 
revenues, and contributed to the higher deficit in 1957 and 1958 (See Figure 3 on the 
price of copper).  The government reacted to the lower price of copper by increasing its 
indebtness form abroad and, especially, by money creation.  In a Report to Congress’ 
Joint Budget Committee, the Mission argued that the negative effects of a lower copper 
price had been amplified because the country lacked sufficient international reserves:  
 
“The lack of a policy aimed at accumulating reserves…during periods when the 
price of copper was high, has implied that during the current year the monetary 
authorities have had to make a major effort to maintain the foreign exchange 
situation under control…Thus, it has been impossible to provide fiscal or credit 
assistance…to depressed regional industries…”41     
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41  Report to the Congress’ Joint Budget Committee, November 7, 1957   20 
 
   As the fiscal imbalance increased, the stabilization program unraveled.  In 1957 the 
wage rule was weakened, and a general wage increase equal to 80% of accumulated 
inflation was decreed.  Moreover, credit controls were relaxed and the money supply 
started to expand at a more rapid pace. As a result of the decline in the price of copper the 
peso became under pressure.  The authorities reacted negatively to the faster depreciation 
of the peso, and responded by increasing trade barriers.  More specifically, during the 
second half of 1957, and against the Mission’s recommendations, prior import deposits 
were increased very significantly.42   
   By early 1958 the Mission’s program was rapidly loosing political support and 
credibility.  In May of that year the Mission issued a report of its work, including a set of 
recommendation for the future.  Many of these had to do with fiscal policy, foreign 
exchange policy and the creation of strong public institutions.43  But perhaps the most 
important set of recommendations had to do with inflation.  The Mission insisted that 
inflationary financing would not provide a path to prosperity.  By October of that year the 
Mission’s work came to an end; inflation was rapidly creeping up.  By December of 1958 
it was 33%, and by June of 1959 it had already reached the 50% mark.   
 
VI.  The Politics of Credibility and the Klein-Saks Mission   
   In order to understand fully the sequence of events that led to the adoption of the 
1955-56 stabilization program it is necessary to explain the role played by the Klein-Saks 
Mission.  What was the actual contribution of these foreign advisors in the 
implementation of this specific program?  How does their work fit, if at all, within the 
political discussions and debates of that time?  In what follows I look at these questions 
from three different perspectives.  I first analyze what was new in the Mission' s 
recommendations.  I then investigate the political reception of the Mission' s proposals, 
and I finally deal with the issue of the Mission' s work and credibility. 
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VI.1  The Klein-Saks Mission as a Technocratic Team 
   The simplest explanation of the Mission' s role is the purely technical one.  
According to this view, foreign consultants would provide policymakers with a type of 
expertise unavailable in the country.  Once the technical diagnosis work is done, 
domestic politicians and policymakers will have a clearer view of the problems at hand 
and, with the help of the advisors, could proceed to design a specific stabilization 
program.  This interpretation of foreign advisors as providing technical expertise not 
available in the country does not require that all participants in the debate agree on the 
causes of inflation, and on the most desirable course of action.  In fact, it is perfectly 
possible to think that this technical knowledge is more in line with a particular political 
view of the world than with others.44   
   Some authors have endorsed the view of the Klein-Saks Mission as technocrats 
providing expertise not available in Chile at that time.  In fact, this was the way the 
Mission was presented by the government in 1955:  repeatedly, administration 
spokesmen and (part of) the media referred to the Mission as a group of politically 
neutral foreign experts that, as medical doctors, were coming to the country to provide a 
diagnosis of the nature of the sickness and suggest a specific treatment.  This is, for 
example, the view of Correa Prieto (1963), who argues that the display of technical 
knowledge made by the Mission' s Chief, Preston Carter, greatly contrasted with the low 
level of preparedness of the local technocrats.45  While Ffrench-Davis (1973) has rejected 
the view that the Mission was political neutral, he has argued that it did indeed provide a 
type of technical expertise unavailable at that time in Chile.  According to him most 
economists were then of a leftist-structuralist persuasion and, consequently, a government 
that wanted to pursue an orthodox type of adjustment program could not elaborate such a 
program with local experts.   
   Although there is little doubt that the Mission was formed by experienced 
professionals that contributed with a number of technical details in the design of policies, 
it is also true that their overall contribution to the diagnosis and formulation of policy was 
limited.  As we have already seen, the Prat failed stabilization proposal (the “Program of 
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Economic Rectification”) of November of 1954 included a large number of the 
components of the Klein-Saks program, including limiting the extent of indexation, fiscal 
austerity, and higher taxes.   
   A lengthy report presented by the Central Bank to the Chamber of Deputies in July 
of 1955 clearly indicates that at that time, at least part of the economics profession in 
Chile had understood the country' s inflationary problems in a way that fully coincided 
with that later developed by the Mission.  For example, the proposed Central Bank 
program called for fiscal restraint, for the elimination of legislation that allowed the 
Treasury to borrow from the Central Bank, for the adoption of a freely fluctuating 
exchange rate, and for the implementation of an imports deposit scheme to control 
foreign trade.  With respect to wages, the report argued that controlling their rate of 
increase was an essential component of the stabilization program.46  It is interesting, 
however, to note that the report was not as forceful regarding wage deindexation as it was 
with respect to the other component of adjustment policies.  This may be explained by the 
fact that it was at that time an exceedingly sensitive political issue, which the Bank Board 
tried to avoid to the extent possible.   
   From the analysis of both the Prat 1954 program and the Central Bank 1955 
document, it is clear that, at least in terms of diagnosis and broad policies, the Klein-Saks 
program did not add novel aspects.  Hirschman (1963) has argued that the only new 
device suggested by the mission was the system of advanced deposits on imports.  This, 
however, it not completely correct.  The Central Bank program specifically proposed 
“requiring [to importers] a deposit in domestic currency in the Central Bank” (Banco 
Central 1956,  p. 77).  What was new in the Mission’s program was the suggestion of a 
dual floating rate system.  The Central Bank program and other proposals that circulated 
at the time called for a unique floating rate.  The absence of spectacular (and almost 
mythical) new policy propositions in the Mission program contrasts sharply with the UN 
report of 1950, which suggested a forced savings scheme as a sort of panacea that would 
quickly, and with little cost, help solve most (if not all) economic problems in Chile.47   
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   The fact that the Mission had not suggested significant new perspectives or policy 
measures was a source of some irritation in Chile.  Many felt that national pride was at 
stake since foreigners were coming into the country, recommending measures already 
discussed many times in the past.  As Hirshman has pointed out, many considered the 
Mission' s program as a (convex) combination of the Herrera and Prat programs of 1953 
and 1954.  The resentful sentiments of a large number of Chileans towards the Mission 
are captured from the opening statement from then Senator, and eventually President of 
the Republic, Salvador Allende during the debate of Law 12,006:   
 
“[I] have stated that there are Chilean professionals with the required knowledge 
and ability to design, on the basis of an organic plan, the measures to be taken.”48 
 
VI.2  War of Attrition, Umpires and Mediators        
   A popular interpretation of the role of foreign advisors and foreign agencies is that 
of an umpire that helps the locals select one of many alternative proposals for action.  
Hirshman (1963), for example, offers this explanation with respect to the role of the 
Kemmerer 1925 Mission that resulted in the foundation of Chile' s Central Bank.  
According to him, when Kemmerer arrived, so many proposals for monetary reform had 
been discussed that the politicians and the public had become utterly confused.  
According to this view the role of the foreign advisors is just to pick one of the many 
proposals and, thus, help solve an impasse.  It is worth quoting Hirshman on this point: 
 
“Examination of the many proposals that were put forward with ever-
increasing frequency in the period 1913-25 makes it clear that the final 
Kemmerer bills did not contain any substantial innovations with respect to 
the crucial topics of restoration of the gold standard and the establishment of 
the Central Bank.  The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the mission 
served principally as an umpire…” (Hirshman, 1967, pp. 176-77; emphasis 
added). 
 
   Alternatively, one can think that foreign advisors provide new information to the 
different groups on the costs and consequences of the crisis, thus convincing some of 
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them that they should give up their “extreme” positions.  According to this interpretation, 
by pointing out angles previously unseen by the different groups, the foreign advisor 
contributes to obtaining an earlier end to the “war of attrition.”  Players that would have 
refused to give up in the absence of this new information, decide to compromise earlier 
on.  This interpretation is close to that provided by the Klein-Saks Mission itself in 1958.  
In a summary document published in May of that year, it is said: 
 
“[T]he only program with a chance of success was deemed to be a broad 
attack on many fronts, in which all factions would contribute, through a 
gradual retreat from their previous extreme positions ... 
In attempting to aid in the implementation of such a program, the Mission 
has always seen its main contribution is acting as an objective advisor on the 
over-all aspects of a balanced program…”  (Klein-Saks, 1958, p. 6). 
 
   Although the interpretation of the role of the Klein-Saks Mission as an umpire and 
a mediator is quite appealing, it presents some problems.49  First, and as it has already 
been established, the Mission contributed very little in terms of new perspectives, and 
provided little new information to what already was on the table in mid-1955.  This casts 
serious doubt on the interpretation based on additional information being provided in the 
context of a war of attrition.   
   A second problem is that war of attrition models assume that, although different 
groups struggle to obtain larger fractions of national income and try to avoid paying a 
large fraction of the costs of stabilization, they basically agree on what should be done to 
eliminate inflation.  In these models there is no “ignorance” or disagreement with respect 
to the way in which the world works.  Inflation, and the inability to put together a timely 
stabilization program, is the unavoidable result of a distributive conflict; in these models 
there is no room for dissenting approaches to stabilizing.  The only source of conflict is 
who pays a larger share of the costs of reducing inflation.  This important assumption of 
the war of attrition models is flatly contradicted by the history of the Klein-Saks program.   
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   The Congressional debate that preceded the approval of Law 12,006 shows that 
different groups and parties strongly disagreed on what was the most adequate course of 
action to defeat inflation.  For example when explaining his negative vote Senator 
Ampuero, the former Secretary-General of the Socialist Party, argued that the proposed 
fluctuating exchange rate was contrary to the goal of solving inflation and staging a 
recovery problem.  Another opposition senator expressed:50 
 
“Honorable Senate, we should remember that even before any wage 
adjustment law was enacted, Chile already suffered from high inflation .... 
Consequently to argue that the law of wage adjustment is the main engine of 
inflation contradicts, in my view, Chile' s economic and history 
experience…”  (Diario del Senado, January 3, 1956, p. 1181) 
         
   But it is perhaps the statement by radical deputy Muñoz-Horz the one that more 
vividly captures the opposing views on the mechanics of inflation: 
 
“[T]he inflationary process has ... increased in an exaggerated way profits of 
productive firms.  This demonstrates that the automatic increase of wages is 
not precisely the engine of inflation… From what has been said it follows 
that in order to end this serious inflationary process it is necessary, first and 
foremost, to fix and freeze prices and immediately to increase salaries, wages 
and pensions so that they achieve parity with prices.”  (Diario de la Cámara 
de Diputados, Dec. 22, 1955, pp. 2549-50) 
 
   It is evident, then, that the views prevailing at the time regarding the causes of 
inflation, and the most appropriate course for the stabilization program, were 
significantly different.  It is difficult, consequently, to agree with the view that the Klein-
Saks Mission acted as a mediator that helped all factions decide how much to contribute 
towards the achievement of the stability growth.  Indeed, the Mission approach was 
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VI.3   Credibility and the Klein-Saks Mission          
   As was pointed out in Section II, modern theories of inflation and stabilization 
have emphasized the role of credibility in achieving a rapid and (relatively) costless 
adjustment process.  To the extent that governments are able to affect expectations, and 
persuade the private sector that a change of regime will be engineered, the disinflation 
process will have a higher probability of success.  The problem, however, is that 
governments tend to have difficulties in making credible promises.  That is, there are 
usually few institutional arrangements that can assure the public that the government will 
not renege on its promises after the private sector has already made important decisions.  
A key issue in establishing credibility, then, is to design mechanisms that will allow the 
government to precommit itself.   
   An interesting line of analytical reasoning postulates that reputational constraints 
can sometimes act as good substitutes for precommitment technology.51  Policymakers 
afraid to damage their reputation will tend to stick to their promises.  This is an elegantly 
plausible idea, but the Ibañez del Campo administration had very little reputational 
capital to protect.  In late 1955 and early 1956, the Ibañez del Campo government was 
particularly non-credible.  The general had changed alliances, denounced former colla-
borators and gyrated too rapidly to give any confidence to the public.   
   The Ibañez del Campo credibility problem is neatly evidenced in the speech given 
by Senator Luis Bossay, chairman of the opposition Radical Party, during the debate on 
Law 12006 on the Stabilization of Prices and Wages.  After arguing that wage 
deindexation constituted only an isolated measure that did not go to the heart of the 
problem, he said: 
 
“It is true that [Finance] Minister Herrera Palacios ... referred to the adoption 
of complementary measures…  Do we have any assurance that after 
approving one measure, the rest of them will be implemented?  ...[T]he cruel 
experience of three years shows that this hesitant, incoherent and 
contradicting government is unable of designing and maintaining, with 
perseverance, a financial and economic policy; we have no confidence that it 
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is committed today of implementing a coherent plan that would put an end to 
the inflationary process…” (Diario de Sesiones del Senado, 3rd January 
1956, p. 1152). 
 
   In fact, the Ibañez del Campo administration announcements and promises had 
become non-credible for every political party in the opposition.  Not only were the center 
and left skeptical regarding the government’s ability to deliver on its promises, but the 
right wing, which the President was seeking as a new ally, was equally doubtful.  Senator 
Moore, from the liberal party, described the government as following a “zig-zagging 
approach full of contradictions and incomplete attitudes.”52  On the other hand, Senator 
Marin, from the liberal party, questioned the government' s ability to maintain an 
announced course of action.   
   The credibility problem had been compounded by the fact that after the abortion of 
the Prat Stabilization Program in November of 1954, there had been four different 
ministers of finance that had taken half-baked and often contradictory measures, while 
inflation continued its rampant pace.   
   In some way the Central Bank was the only public institution that had some 
credibility.  Its professional staff was well respected and as we have seen its proposed 
stabilization program of July 1955 was sophisticated and suggested a number of 
fundamental measures.  The Bank, however, was handicapped by its lack of 
independence from the government.  In spite of a reform to its Charter in 1953, the Board 
was still dominated by representatives of the executive.  This lack of independence was 
so evident that during his short tenure as minister of finance the populist Guillermo del 
Pedregal strongly maneuvered to oust the Central Bank Governor Arturo Maschke.53 
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        When looked at from the perspective of a government with total lack of credibility 
and virtually no reputational capital, recurring to an external advisor begins to make 
sense.  By taking this measure the government was signalling its intentions of altering its 
behavior.  It is also possible that the government officials expected that by hiring the 
Mission they were acquiring some reputational capital.  Additionally, by doing this, a 
sense of continuity was introduced into the program.  Even if Ibañez del Campo decided 
to replace the minister of finance, the mission technocrat were still around to carry on the 
battle.   
   A number of authors have recently argued that external agencies, such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, can provide credibility to adjustment 
and stabilization programs.54  This can happen in two related ways:  first, by violating 
agreements with these agencies the country in question will incur in costs that will 
usually come in the form of losses of resources obtained through specific programs.  
These costs, of course, will make policy changes less probable than otherwise.  Second, 
through the monitoring of the country' s economic performance the external agencies 
provide information to other (external) actors, including foreign government, and private 
creditors.  In a way, through the provision of information these external institutions make 
the country' s reputation more transparent and easy to control, thus making this constraint 
more binding. 
   Although the Klein-Saks mission did not have funds of its own to provide to the 
Chilean government, its connections with the international financial community and the 
U.S. government made its role rather effective.  In fact, after putting together the most 
important element of the stabilization program, the mission helped the government obtain 
U.S. $70 million in fresh resources.  Additionally, the mission' s work during late 1955 
and early 1956 paved the path for Chile' s stand-by agreement with the IMF in April of 
1956.  This, however, leaves open the question of why the Chilean government decided 
to hire private advisors rather than going directly the IMF.  There are two explanations 
for this decision.  First, at this time the IMF had relatively little experience in setting up 
programs with the developing countries.  For instance during 1953-1955 a total of only 
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five stand by agreements had been signed, with most of them being with European 
nations.  Additionally, the fact that the Klein mission to Peru in 1949-1954 had been well 
received by the international community made the Washington consultants natural 
candidates for this job.  Second, hiring a private advisory group that would take residency 
in Santiago, and would provide a daily monitoring of the economic situation,  helped the 
government to gain political credibility with the domestic right, whose support it required 
to approve the key elements of the program.   
   The mounting political tension of 1955 greatly influenced the right' s decision to 
change its strategy and to support the Ibañez del Campo administration anti-inflation 
program.  It became apparent at that time that the increasing economics chaos had 
generated serious anti-democratic sentiments among sectors of the military.  The 
“Straight Line” (Linea Recta) movement was acting openly and a number of nationalistic 
elements were calling Ibañez del Campo to close Congress, and to establish himself as an 
autocratic ruler that would return order and put an end to inflation.  This possibility 
represented great political danger for the rightist politicians who clearly remembered the 
setbacks suffered during the first Ibañez del Campo authoritarian rule in 1924.  
Moreover, at this point the conservative-liberal coalition had great expectations that their 
candidate could win the upcoming Presidential election in 1958.55  In a way, then, the 
right was caught between two undesirable alternatives:  to continue opposing Ibañez del 
Campo at all costs and, thus, risking a coup that would seriously jeopardize their chance 
of getting the presidency; or to support an untrustworthy administration that was well 
known for its gyrations and changes in policies.   
   The fact that the right weighted the political consequences of not supporting the 
stabilization program is apparent from liberal Senator Moore' s speech on the 3rd of 
January, 1955.56  He candidly stated: 
 
“The liberal Party does not favor a coup d' etat; it does not expect ... to 
resolve this issue by force and by spilling blood ... We desire that Mr. Ibañez 
serves his full term…”  (p. 1147). 
 
                                                            
55Jorge Alessandri, the right candidate, in fact won that election. 
56The quotes that follow come from the Diario de Sesiones del Senado, 1/3/55.   30 
And he went on to say: 
 
“We do not favor a coup ... Should we, then, blindly oppose the government 
from Congress?  No.  That would damage even more the reputation of the 
political parties; it would offer a motive to finish them and to close 
Congress…”  (p. 1148) 
 
And, he referred to the dilemma faced by his party in the following way: 
 
“We will continue to defend legality, and we are demonstrating this by 
providing Mr. Ibañez with a legal tool.  We place a delicate tool in clumsy 
hands…”  (p. 1148). 
 
        However, one thing was to weight the costs of not supporting the government and 
seeing the economic situation further deteriorate, and a different thing to provide Mr. 
Ibañez del Campo with a blank check.  In order to support the government, the right 
required certain guarantees that the overall package would include policies particularly 
important for this group.  Among these policies, perhaps the most controversial one 
referred to the reform of the exchange rate system, including the adoption of a freely 
fluctuating rate.  The key importance attached by the right to the exchange rate policy is 
manifest in a number of interventions in the Congressional debate of that time.  For 
instance, conservative Senator Prieto stated:   
 
“[T]here is no possibility of expanding production if the [foreign exchange law] 
retains ... fixed and discriminatory rates ...” (Diario de Sesiones del Senado, 1/3/55, 
p. 1167.) 
 
   In this regard, then, the Klein-Saks Mission, with its historical record of supporting 
fluctuating rates and its good relation with the International Monetary Fund, provided an 
important element in persuading the Right to support the government.  The Klein-Saks 
Mission provided, to the extent possible, an assurance that the policies were going to be 
consistent with what had been (implicitly) agreed upon.  In other words, by having hired 
the Klein-Saks Mission the government not only sought to obtain domestic and   31 
international economic credibility, but it was also trying to credibly precommit to a key 
political group that there would be no sudden changes in the future course of action.         
But, how credible was the Mission' s program?  Did the Mission' s work in fact, affect 
expectations?  And, if it did, was this a short term break in expectations, or was it 
relatively long-lasting?57 This, and related issues, are tackled in detail in Section VII of 
this paper.  
 
VII.  Policy Credibility and Structural Breaks:  An Empirical Investigation 
   In his highly influential work on inflation and stabilization, Sargent (1983, 
1986) has argued that a credible anti-inflationary program results in a rapid change 
in the monetary and inflationary regimes.  If the public believes that the policy will 
work – that is, that the policy is credible --, it will incorporate its changed 
expectations into its decision making process, including decisions on pricing, 
speculation, wage bargaining, capital flows and so on.  These changes in 
expectations, in turn, will be translated into a change in the behavior of endogenous 
variables, such as interest rates, exchange rates and inflation.  This, for instance, 
was what happened during Raymond Poincare’s stabilization program in France in 
the 1920s.  It is also what happened with the founding of the Federal Reserve 
System, in late 1914.58    
   From an econometric point of view, credible changes in regime will be 
reflected in break points in the time series of the key endogenous variables.  For 
example, as argued in Edwards (1993, 1998) a credible stabilization program 
would be reflected in a decline in the degree of inertia in the rate of inflation.  In 
this section I use data on the black market exchange rate premium, as well as on 
inflation to analyze the extent to which the policies of the Klein-Saks Mission were 
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58 See Mankiw, Miron and Weil (1987) for an analysis on the change in interest rate behavior after the 
founding of the Fed, a policy that the authors (rightly) consider to represent a major change in regime in 
U.S. monetary policy.  In Edwards (1998) I used short term interest rate data to analyze whether changes in 
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indeed credible.59  Generally speaking, a credible stabilization program should be 
reflected in a very rapid – i.e. instantaneous – break in the time series properties of 
financial variables, such as interest rates and (market determined) exchange rates.  
A credible stabilization program would also be reflected, although more slowly, on 
structural breaks in the time series behavior of inflation.  In particular, if the 
stabilization program is indeed credible, the rate of persistence (or inertia) would 
rapidly decline, as would the expected long term rate of inflation. 
VII.1   The Credibility of the Klein-Saks Mission and the Exchange Rate 
   In Figure 4 I present the evolution of the official exchange rate, as well as the 
parallel (i.e. free) market exchange rate for the period January 1953-December 1956.  As 
may be seen, the month the mission arrived into Chile, September 1955, the parallel 
market rate (PER) experienced a drastic decline of 23% -- it went from 770 pesos per 
dollar in August, to 595 pesos per dollar in September.  This is quite impressive 
considering that at that point the Mission had very little to show for its work.  In the next 
two months, however, the public became increasingly skeptical, with the parallel rate 
climbing back to high levels -- although not as high as the maximum attained in August 
of 1955.  In January of 1956, once Law 12,006 was approved, the parallel rate fell by 
24%, and the premium declined by almost 70%.  During 1956 the parallel market rate 
was rather stable and after the adoption of the new exchange rate regime in April the 
premium virtually disappeared (see Figure 4), suggesting that the private sector perceived 
the Klein-Saks effort as a serious attempt at changing the nature of the inflationary 
process.  Interestingly enough, as can be seen from the figure, the only other period with 
a significant decline in the free market rate corresponds to Prat’s tenure as Minister of 
Finance.  However, as soon as it became apparent that his program was not going to be 
approved by Congress, the free market rate rapidly climbed to higher levels (see shaded 
area in Figure 4). This figure, then, suggests that there was a short-lived break in 
expectations that took place at the arrival of the Mission. 
   In order to analyze formally the extent to which the Mission affected expectations, 
I estimated a series of equations for the parallel market exchange rate premium, and I 
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analyzed whether the equation had exhibited a structural break around the time the 
Mission began its work.  The basic equation has the following form: 
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Where premium is the parallel market premium; OERt is the official exchange rate; 
t OER is the “equilibrium” nominal exchange rate, that would prevail in the absence of 
rationing; 
M
M t 1 - D
is the excess supply of money M1; and ￿ is an error term assumed to 
have the standard properties.  As long as there are exchange restrictions, the intercept will 
be significantly positive.  Generally speaking, we would expect ￿1 to be positive, 
indicating that a the larger is the gap between the equilibrium and the actual official 
nominal exchange rate, the larger will be the premium.  Notice, that this means that, to 
the extent that the equilibrium nominal exchange rate is unchanged, a nominal 
devaluation of the official rate (that is an increase in  t OER log ) will result in a decline in 
the parallel market premium.  The ￿2 coefficient is expected to be positive, indicating that 
a larger excess supply for money will result in a larger premium.  Coefficient ￿3 is 
expected to be positive and smaller than one.  This coefficient measures the degree of 
inertia of the foreign exchange premium; the closer this coefficient to one, the higher is 
the degree of inertia.   
   A credible stabilization plan is expected to be reflected in a structural beak in 
equation (1) governing the foreign exchange premium.  More specifically, when a 
credible stabilization plan is implemented, it is expected that the values of both ￿0 and ￿1 
will decline.  Indeed, under extreme credibility that eliminates inflationary pressures and 
exchange restrictions, it would be expected that ￿0 and ￿1 would very rapidly converge to 
zero.  Notice that in this case the equilibrium (steady state) value of the premium would 
be equal to zero.   
   In order to analyze if the adoption of the Klein-Saks program indeed affected 
expectations, I followed the following strategy.  First, I use equation stability tests to 
analyze whether there is a breakpoint in equations of the type of (1) around the time of   34 
the program’s adoption.  Second, I add a number of dummy variables to the estimation of 
equations of the type of (1), as a way of analyzing this issue in greater detail.  I am 
particularly interested in investigating whether ￿0 and ￿1 experienced a significant decline 
at the time of the program.  In this analysis I have used the Hodrick-Prescott stochastic 
trend component of (the log of) the official exchange rate as a proxy for t OER .60 All the 
results discussed in this section were obtained using monthly data.  See the Appendix for 
exact variables’ definitions and sources. 
   In Table 4 I present regression results for equation (1).  The first column uses a 
1948-1958 sample, while in columns (2) the sample covers the 1948-1962 period.  The 
results are quite similar across these two base equations; all the coefficients have the 
expected signs and are significant at conventional levels.  These estimates suggest that 
during this period the parallel market premium had a very high degree of inertia.  Indeed, 
the estimated coefficient for the lagged premium is 0.78 and 0.85.  In the discussion that 
follows I focus on the results obtained when the 1948-1962 sample is used.61  As pointed 
out earlier, an important question for the credibility analysis is whether there was a 
change of regime at the time of the Mission’s program.  An F-test for equation stability 
suggests that equation (1) indeed experienced a structural break during the September 
1955 and the September 1958 period:  the value of the test is 15.8, indicating that the null 
hypothesis of no structural breaks is rejected at conventional levels.62   
   As a way of understanding further the reaction of expectations and of the foreign 
exchange market to the Mission’s program, I included dummy variables for the 1955-
1958 in the estimation of equation (1).  In total, seven dummies were included:  the first 
one (D552) takes a value of one for the September-December 1955 period, and zero other 
wise.  The other dummies – D561, D562, D571, D572, D581, and D582 – take a value of 
one for the respective six month period, and a value of zero otherwise (that is, D561 has 
ones for January-June 1956).  The results, which are in Column (3) of Table 4, indicate 
                                                            
60  I also assumed that for the period under study the equilibrium nominal rate was a constant.  In this case 
instead of the nominal exchange rate gap, the estimated equation will only have the log of the official rate.  
In terms of the credibility analysis, the results obtained when this alternative specification was used were 
similar to those discussed here, and have not been reported due to space considerations.   
61  This is appropriate, since in 1960-61 a new and bold stabilization program based on the pegging of the 
exchange rate and the elimination of all capital account restrictions was put into place.  For details see, for 
example, Ffrench-Davis (1973). 
62 This is a Chow F-test.  The null hypothesis is that there are no structural breaks.   35 
that the effects of the Mission’s program on expectations and the foreign exchange 
market were quite complex.  As soon as the Mission arrived – and even before it started 
working -- there was a sharp decline in the degree of persistence of the premium: the 
coefficient of  ) 552 ( 1 - ´ t premium D  is -0.721 and significant at the 5% level.  This 
suggests that by the end of 1955 the parallel market premium had completely lost 
persistence – indeed a ￿
2 test indicates that the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients 
cannot be rejected at conventional levels.  The results also indicate that the coefficient of 
) 561 ( 1 - ´ t premium D is significantly negative, with a point estimate of -0.721; moreover, 
the null hypothesis that the degree of inertia in the first half of 1956 is zero cannot be 
rejected.  These results indeed suggest that the hiring of the Mission indeed altered 
expectations, and changed the structural behavior of the parallel market premium. 
   This decline (or disappearance) in the degree of persistence was short lived 
however.  As may be seen from Table 4, starting in the second half of 1956, the 
coefficients of the dummy variables interacted with the lagged premium are not 
significantly different from zero, and the degree of persistence in the parallel market for 
foreign exchange goes back to what it had been before the Mission’s arrival in Chile.  As 
may be seen, the intercept dummies are not significantly different from zero. 
 VII.2   Credibility and Inflationary Inertia 
   An important question is whether inflationary inertia declined in Chile in the period 
surrounding the Klein-Saks stabilization program.  In order to do this I estimated a 
number of equations of the following type: 
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Inf is inflation, measured as the percentage change in the CPI relative to the same month 
in the prior year; 
M
M t 1 - D
 is the rate of growth of M1, also measured relative to the 
previous year; DevPar is the rate of change in the parallel (i.e. free) exchange rate; 
DevOff is the rate of change of the official exchange rate; Dummy is a dummy variable   36 
that takes the value of one during the stabilization program; Sj are seasonal dummies; and 
￿t is an AR(12) error term.63  To the extent that the stabilization program has indeed 
resulted in a decline in the degree of inertia, the estimated coefficient for ￿5 would be 
significantly negative.  As in the analysis of the exchange rate market, in the estimation I 
considered several alternative dummy variable that cover different time spans. 
   In Table 5 I present the results obtained from the estimation of several versions of 
equation (2).  Since the rate of devaluation in the parallel (i.e. free) market is endogenous, 
I used instrumental variables in the estimation; the standard errors were estimated using 
the Newey-West procedure.64 The estimates in Column (1) assume that there are no 
structural breaks during the period under study.  In Column (2) I have used one dummy 
variable (DKS) for the complete Klein-Saks period; it takes the value of one for 
September 1955-September 1958, and zero otherwise.   In Column (2) I have 
distinguished seven sub-periods; as in Table 4, the dummies D552, D561, D561, D562, 
D571, D572, D581, and D582 refer to six successive six months periods.65 As may be 
seen, during the period under study inflation experienced a very significant degree of 
inertia.  For instance the estimate of the lagged dependent variable in Column (1) is 
0.896.  The coefficients of money creation and exchange rate changes are positive as 
expected, and with the exception of the coefficient of 
M
M t 1 - D
 are significant at 
conventional levels.  Column (2) suggests that the degree of the Klein Saks program there 
was a very small, and statistically significant, decline in inertia:  the estimated coefficient 
of  ) ( 1 - ´ t Inf DKS is equal to -0.044 and has a t-statistic of -2.36.  The results in Column 
(3) look at this issue in greater detail, by replacing DKS with the array of dummies D551-
D582.  As may be seen, these results give a rather more textured and complex story: 
according to these estimates the decline in inflationary inertia was small and very short 
lived, and took place during the first half of 1956.  This is immediately after Law 12,006 
                                                            
63  Since the monthly rate of inflation is defined as a year over year variable, equation (2) has to be 
estimated under the assumption of an AR(12) error.    
64 The following instruments were used: xx,xx,xx. Because inflation is computed on a 12 months basis, the 
seasonal variables turned out to be non significant, and were excluded in the final estimation.  If included 
the results are virtually the same as in Table 5. 
65 A preliminary analysis indicates that the intercept did not change during the period under study.  
Consequently, no dummies for the intercept were included in the regressions reported in Table 5.   37 
that reduced the extent of wage indexation was approved by congress.  If the program had 
been credible, one would have expected that during the next few months inertia would 
have fallen further.  According to the results in column (3) the opposite, actually 
happened: beginning in the second half of 1956 the degree of inflationary inertia was 
back to the level it had had prior to the program.  
   As a final step in this analysis I used a Kalman-Filter approach to estimate a time-
varying coefficient version of equation (2).  In the estimation I assumed that the 
coefficient of Inft-1 was the only time-varying coefficient. As before, I assumed that the 
error term was characterized by an AR(12) process.  The result obtained for the inertia 
coefficient is displayed in Figure 5.  This figure shows very clearly that in the months 
preceding the arrival of the Klein-Saks mission the degree of inflationary inertia in Chile 
was increasing rapidly.  Indeed, the coefficient of Inft-1 climbed from 0.81 in mid 1953 to 
0.92 by mid 1955.  This figure also confirms the findings in Table 5: immediately after 
the Klein-Saks mission began its work there was a very small reduction in inertia.  This, 
however, did not gather force, nor was it very significant.  By late 1958, the degree of 
inertia continued to be substantial; indeed much higher that in mid 1953. 
 
VIII.  Concluding Remark 
In this paper I have analyzed Chile’s experience with anti-inflationary policies in 
the mid 1950s.  In 1955-58 Chile implemented a stabilization package with the advice of 
the U.S. consulting firm of Klein-Saks.  The Klein-Saks program took place in a period 
of acute political confrontation.  After what was considered to be an initial success -- 
inflation declined to 38% in 1956, and was further reduced to 17% in 1957 -- the program 
failed to achieve durable price stability.  I have argued that the foreign advisors of the 
Klein-Saks Mission gave initial credibility to the stabilization program launched in 1955.  
The Mission’s foreign advisors played the role of independent, non-partisan, technocratic 
arbiters.  It was precisely because they were foreigners that they could raise above the 
political fray, and suggest a specific program, whose main components were rapidly 
approved by a highly divided Congress.  The fact that the program was very similar to 
one proposed earlier by the government – and that was rejected by Congress -- 
underscores the view that, while locals are suspect of being excessively partisan,   38 
foreigners are often (but not always) seen as independent policy brokers.  But providing 
initial credibility was not enough to ensure success.  In spite of supporting trade reform, 
foreign exchange rate reform, and the de-indexation of wages, Congress failed to act 
decisively on the fiscal front.  Consequently the fiscal imbalances that had plagued Chile 
for a long time were reduced, but not eliminated.  In 1957 a sharp drop in the 
international price of copper – the country’s main export – resulted in a major decline in 
fiscal revenue and in an increase in the fiscal deficit.  The Mission recommended a series 
of belt-tightening measures, but politicians had had enough of orthodoxy.  No adjustment 
was made, and inflationary expectations once again shifted for the worse.  In Section VII 
I presented empirical results on the evolution of inflation, exchange rates and interest 
rates that support my historical analysis.  
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Table 1 
Inflation Rate: 1946-1958 
(Dec. to Dec. CPI % change) 
 
Year  Inflation rate 
1946  30.1 
1947  23.1 
1948  16.8 
1949  20.4 
1950  16.7 
1951  22.8 
1952  12.0 
1953  56.6 
1954  71.0 
1955  84.0 
1956  37.8 
1957  17.1 
1958  32.5 
1959  32.9 
1960  5.4 
1961  10.2 
1962  26.7 
      Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 
Table 2 
Multiple Exchange Rates: 1947-1955 
(Chilean Pesos per U.S. Dollar at End of Year) 
 
  Government  Preferential  Official  Banking  Special  Commercial 
1947  19.37  25  31  .  .  . 
1948  19.37  25
a  31  43
c  .  . 
1949  19.37  25  31  43  .  . 
1950  19.37  25  31  43  50
d  60
e 
1951  19.37  -  31  43  50  60 
1952  19.37  -  31  43  50  60 
1953  -  -  110
b  -  -  - 
1954  -  -  200
f  -  -  - 
1955  -  -  200  -  -  - 
  Source: Pick’s Currency Yearbook, several issues. 
 
a Discontinued January 9th 
 
b Devaluation October 5th 
 
c Beginning February 4th 
 
d Beginning August 1st 
 
e Beginning January 10th 
 
f Devaluation November 10th 
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Table 3 
Fiscal Deficit: 1952-1964 
 
  Deficit Fiscal 
(% GDP) 
1952  4.3 
1953  4.9 
1954  4.0 
1955  4.2 
1956  2.2 
1957  3.6 
1958  3.2 
1959  3.9 
1960  5.3 
1961  5.1 
1962  6.2 
1963  5.5 
1964  4.9 
  Source: Ffrench Davis (1973) and IMF. 
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Table 4 
Credibility and Exchange Rate Premium:  Regression Analysis 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Constant  0.283  0.139  0.208 
  (3.896)***  (3.028)***  (3.913)*** 
Nominal exchange rate disequilibrium  1.771  1.494  1.657 
  (7.355)***  (7.477)***  (8.167)*** 
M1 excess of supply   0.020  0.016  0.018 
  (1.905)*  (2.109)**  (2.329)** 
Lagged Premium   0.779  0.847  0.827 
  (21.772)***  (32.252)***  (29.473)*** 
D552* Lagged Premium  -  -  -0.721 
      (-2.113)** 
D561*Lagged Premium  -  -  -0.721 
      (-1.993)** 
D562*Lagged Premium  -  -  -1.107 
      (-0.425) 
D571*Lagged Premium  -  -  1.865 
      (0.408) 
D572*Lagged Premium  -  -  -0.409 
      (-0.225) 
D581*Lagged Premium  -  -  -0.277 
      (-0.294) 
D582*Lagged Premium  -  -  -0.414 
      (-0.191) 
D552  -  -  1.162 
      (1.531) 
D561  -  -  0.163 
      (0.620) 
D562  -  -  0.133 
      (0.390) 
D571      -0.426 
  -  -  (-0.730) 
D572      -0.175 
  -  -  (-0.527) 
D581      -0.183 
  -  -  (-0.619) 
D582      -0.165 
      (-0.221) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.88  0.90  0.91 
Durbin-Watson  1.67  1.80  1.73 
Akaike info criterion  10.41  10.18  10.21 
Schwarz criterion  10.50  10.25  10.53 
F-statistic  313.28  535.78  100.34 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Sample  48-3: 58-12  48-3: 62-12  48-3: 62-12 
Observations  130  178  178 
  t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
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Table 5 
Credibility and Inflation Inertia: Regression Analysis (IV) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
        Constant  0.096  -0.583  -0.067 
  (0.123)  (-0.702)  -0.071) 
Lagged inflation  0.896  0.938  0.940 
  (26.801)***  (31.188)***  (26.370)*** 
Lagged M1 growth  0.028  0.037  0.020 
  (0.689)  (0.922)  (0.555) 
Lagged free exchange rate growth  0.045  0.043  0.035 
  (4.330)***  (4.098)***  (2.884)*** 
Lagged official exchange rate growth  0.021  0.013  0.014 
  (3.018)  (1.601)  (1.386) 
DKS*Lagged inflation    -0.044   
    (-2.358)**   
D552* Lagged inflation      0.007 
      (0.237) 
D561* Lagged inflation      -0.052 
      (-1.738)* 
D562* Lagged inflation      -0.036 
      (-1.217) 
D571* Lagged inflation      -0.017 
      (-0.658) 
D572* Lagged inflation      -0.088 
      (-1.082) 
D581* Lagged inflation      0.002 
      (0.039) 
D582*Lagged inflation      0.042 
      (0.355) 
AR(12)  -0.400  -0.423  -0.413 
  (-4.479)***  (-4.999)***  (-4.113)*** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.97  0.98  0.97 
Durbin-Watson  1.44  1.56  1.56 
F-statistic  1158.96  1023.07  496.10 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Sample  50:2-62:12  50:2-62:12  50:2-62:12 
Observations  155  155  155 
t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Variable  Definition  Source 
     
Inflation  Rate of growth of 
Consumer Price index  
International Financial Statistics, IMF, 
various issues. 
Official exchange rate  Chilean pesos per U.S. 
dollar 
Monthly bulletin, Central Bank of Chile, 
various issues. 
Market exchange rate  Chilean pesos per U.S. 
dollar 
Pick’s Currency Yearbook, Pick 
Publishing Corporation, New York, 
various issues. 
Money supply  Monetary base: M1  Mamalakis, M. J. (1983): Historical 
statistics of Chile. Money, Prices, and 
Credit Services. Vol. 4. Greenwood Press. 
     
 
 
 